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A STUDY IN THE INVALIDITY OF MEMORIALIZATION
RESCISSION RESOLUTIONS
By
FRANK E. PACKARD*
Twenty-'eight state legislatures have passed resolutions memorializing the
United States Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States limiting federal income tax
rates at twenty-five per cent in peacetime.
Similar action by four more state general assemblies is necessary in order to
have two-thirds of the states, or thirty-two states, as! required by Article 5 of the
Constitution before the Congress has to call the convention for the purpose of
proposing an amendment to the Constitution imposing a twenty-five per cent
ceiling on federal income tax rates in peacetime.
Of the twenty-eight state legislatures which adopted the foregoing resolutions those of Alabama, 1 Illinois, 2 Kentucky s and Wisconsin 4 rescinded their
passage of such resolutions. The resolutions of rescission subsequently adopted
by the legislatures of these four states are null and void and are of no legal effect whatsoever.
This can be proved conclusively (1) by keeping in mind the federal amendatory process provided for in Article 5 as follows: "The Congress, whenever twothirds. of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this
constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several
states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case,
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by conventions
in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress. . ."5. (emphasis mine)-and (2) by comparing memorialization by states with proposal by the Congress and comparing the right of a
state to withdraw a memorialization with the right of the Congress to withdraw
a proposal.
Such a right does not exist in either case according to Professor Lester
Bernhardt Orfield, who in his text book, The Amending of the Federal Constitution, states as follows:
*Senior partner in the Chicago law firm of Packard and Evans; member of the Bars of the
Supreme Court of the State of Ilinois and the Supreme Court of the United States.
1 Ala. Acts, p. 155 (1945).
2 Il. Laws, p. 1797 (1945),
8 Ky. Acts, p. 720 (1946).
4 Wis. Laws, pp. 1126, 1127 (1944-45).

5 U.S. Const., Art. 5.

NOTES

"Suppose Congress should attempt to withdraw an amendment
after it had been proposed. This question was directly raised in 1864
when Senator Anthony proposed to repeal the joint resolution submitting the Corwin amendment. .... The practice has been to regard
such a withdrawal as ineffectual. The theory apparently is that each
affirmative step in the passage of an amendment is irrevocable .... confusion would be introduced if Congress were permitted to retract its
actions." 6
This view is shared by Professor Francis M. Burdick, who in his text book,
The Law of the American Constitution, states that "it seems safe to assert that
Congress, having once submitted a proposed constitutional amendment to the
".."7
Professor
States, cannot thereafter withdraw it from their consideration .
Orfield continues, stating that "in such a case the analogy of a state legislature's
attempting to withdraw its ratification of an amendment would seem apposite."
Additional proof that a state legislature does not have the legal right to
rescind a memorialization resolution may be adduced by comparing the right of a
state to withdraw a memorialization and the right of the Congress to withdraw
a proposal on the one hand with the right of a state to withdraw a ratification of
a proposed amendment to the Constitution on the other hand for as the Supreme
Court of the United States declared in 1921 in the case of Dillon v. Gloss "....
proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding
.8 In the case of this additional comparison the
steps in a single endeavor ..
answer is the same, since a state cannot withdraw a ratification.
Judge John Alexander Jameson in his text book, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions-Their History, Powers and Modes of Proceeding, states that:
"Th'e language of the Constitution is, that amendments proposed by
Congress, in the mode prescribed, 'shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states' etc. By this language is conferred upon
the states, by the national Constitution, a special power; it is not a power
belonging to them originally by virtue of rights reserved or otherwise.
When exercised, as contemplated by the Constitution, by ratifying, it
ceases to be a power, and any attempt to exercise it again must be a
nullity. . . .When ratified by the legislature of a state, it will be final
as to such state .... When ratified alE power is expended." 9
Professor Walter F. Dodd, writing in the Yale Law Journal, states that:
".. .. the view is incontrovertible, that a state, once having ratified,
may not withdraw that ratification .... to construe the Constitution other6 Orfield, Professor Lester Bernhardt, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, rhe
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, p. 52 (1942).
7 Burdick, Professor Francis M., THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT, G. P. Putnam's Sons, N.Y., p. 39 (1922).
8 256 U.S. 368, 374, 375; 65 L.Ed. 994, 997; 41 S.Ct. 510, 512 (1921).
9 Jameson, Judge John Alexander, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTION CONVENTIONS-THEIR HiSTORY, POWERS AND MODES OF PROCEEDING, Callaghan and Co. Chicago, §§ 579, 581 (1887).
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wise, would be to permit great confusion in that no state in ratifying
could know what the status of the amendment was if at the same time
other states were permitted to withdraw. Of course, confusion would
occur also in that it would be difficult to know when three-fourths of
the states had ratified .... The function of ratification seems to be one
which, when once done, is fully completed, and leaves no power whatever in the hands of the state legislature." 10
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held in 1937 in the case of Wise v.
Chandler that:
"It is the prevailing.

.

. .view of writers on the question that a

resolution of ratification of an amendment to the federal Constitution, whether adopted by the legislature or a convention, is irrevocable.
This conclusion seems inescapable as to the action of a convention called
for the purpose of acting upon an amendment. When it has acted and
adjourned, its power is exhausted. Since the 'powers and disabilities'
of the two classes of representative assemblies mentioned in Article 5 are
'precisely the same,' when a legislature, sitting, not as a lawmaking body,
but as such an assembly, has acted upon a proposal for an amendment,
it likewise has exhausted its power in this connection."'"
The Supreme Court of Kansas in the same year ruled in the case of Coleman
v. Miller that:
"It is generally agreed by lawyers, statesmen and publicists who
have debated this question that a. . . .ratification once given cannot be
withdrawn. . . .from historical precedents, it is. . . .true that where a
state has once ratified an amendment it has no power th'ereafter to withdraw such ratification. To hold otherwise would make Article 5 of the
federal Constitution read that the amendment should be valid 'when
ratified by three-fourths of the states, each adhering to its vote until
thr'ee-fourths of all the legislatures shall have voted to ratify'. . . .when
a proposed amendment has once been ratified the power to act on the
proposed amendment ceases to exist."12
When a state adopts a resolution memorializing the Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing an amendment to the Constitution that
state is engaging in a "federal function" which places such activity within the
exclusive domain of federal jurisdiction and completely removes it from the pale
of state province and beyond the power of state withdrawal. The truth of this
is manifest since the function of a state legislature in memorializing the Congress
to call a convention for the purpose of proposing an amendment is derived wholly
from the Constitution the same as is either the function of the Congress in proposing an amendment or the function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed
amendment and since the latter two functions have been judicially identified as
federal functions totally without state realm.
10 Dodd, Professor Walter F., "Amending the Federal Constitution," 30 YALE L.J. 321, 346 (1921).
I1 270 Ky. 1, 8, 9; 108 S.W.2d 1024, 1028 (1937).
12 146 Kan. 390, 400, 403; 71 P.2d 518, 524 526 (1937).
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The Supreme Court of Kansas declared in 1937 in the Coleman v. Miller
case that:
"It is settled beyond controversy that the function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, like the function of Congress in proposing an amendment,
is a federal function derived from the federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitation sought to be imposed by the people of a state. (Emphasis mine.) The power to legislate in the enactment of the laws of a
state is derived from the people of the state, but the power to ratify a
proposed amendment to the federal constitution has its source in that instrument. The act of ratification by the state derives its authority from
the federal Constitution, to which the state and its people alike have assented .... If the legislature, in ratifying a proposed amendment, is performing a federal function, it would seem to follow that ratification is
not an act of legislation in the proper sense of that term. It has been so
held." 18
18 146 Kan. 390, 392, 393; 71 P.2d 518, 520 (1937).

